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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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920274-CA
*
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SERVICE CORPORATION; and
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*

Defendants/Appellees.

Priority No. 7
Industrial Commission
Case No. 91001038

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1990) and Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-86 (1988).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Jamie Bacon's appeal must be dismissed in its

entirety because the issues addressed in her brief were never
preserved for appeal:

The appellate issues advanced by Ms. Bacon

were never brought to the attention of the Industrial Commission
and have been asserted for the first time on appeal.
2.

Whether the administrative law judge and the Utah

Industrial Commission acted appropriately in dismissing Ms.
Bacon's claim with prejudice because Ms. Bacon and her attorney
wholly failed to cooperate in discovery, neglected to respond to
defense motions, and ignored the Industrial Commission's direct

Order calling for the applicant to file an amended pleading
specifying the factual basis of her industrial accident.
3.

Whether Utah's "Open Courts" constitutional provision

guarantees that a worker's compensation claim can never be
dismissed with prejudice.
4.

Whether the United States and Utah Constitutions

guarantee effective assistance of counsel in non-criminal cases.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Two standards of review are pertinent to Ms. Bacon's appeal:
1.

As a threshold matter, the Utah Court of Appeals must

determine whether any of the issues addressed in appellant's
brief have been preserved for appellate consideration.

This

inquiry is governed by Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d
613 (Utah 1984) and Johnson v. Department of Employment Security,
782 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1989) which hold that all issues (even
constitutional issues) which are not raised during the
administrative proceedings below cannot be asserted for the first
time on appeal.
2.

An examination of the merits of Ms. Bacon's appeal will

focus on the narrow inquiry of whether the Industrial Commission
acted appropriately in upholding the sanction of a dismissal with
prejudice.

The propriety of such a dismissal is governed by an

abuse of discretion standard of review, since trial courts are
2

afforded broad deference in conducting discovery matters and
imposing sanctions for non-compliance with their orders and
procedures.

See, W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West

Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977); G. M. Leasing Corp. v.
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975); Sheid
v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo. App. 1991).
The standards for review cited in appellant's brief have
nothing to do with this appeal because: (1) there was no "fact
finding" entered below which the Utah Court of Appeals is called
upon to review, and (2) no interpretation of any statute or
constitutional provision was ever involved at any stage of the
proceedings below.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The statutory and administrative procedural provisions
governing this appeal (assuming that the Utah Court of Appeals
rules that the issues contained in the appellant's brief have
somehow been preserved for appeal) are the following:
1.

Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(attached hereto as Addendum "A");
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (attached as Addendum "B"); and

3.

Industrial Commission Procedural Rule R490-1-4 (attached

hereto as Addendum "C").

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below.

Ms. Bacon claims she is entitled to worker's compensation
benefits for an alleged January 17, 1991 industrial accident.
At the time she signed and filed her Application for Hearing,
Ms. Bacon (and her counsel) left the factual allegations section
of the Application completely blank.

Ms. Bacon and her attorney

subsequently failed to respond to the defendants' Interrogatories
and Motion for a More Definite Statement.

Ms. Bacon and her

attorney also failed to comply with an Industrial Commission
Order which directed the applicant to file an Amended Application
for Hearing.

In the Amended Application (which was never filed),

Ms. Bacon was to have specified the factual basis for her alleged
industrial injury.

Due to Ms. Bacon's failure to comply with the

Industrial Commission Order, and given her general failure to
prosecute her claim, the administrative law judge assigned to the
case finally dismissed the Application for Hearing after a
properly filed Motion to Dismiss had been submitted by the
defendants.
Ms. Bacon and her attorney filed a Motion for Review with
the Industrial Commission seeking a reversal of the
administrative law judge's dismissal with prejudice.

In her

Motion, Ms. Bacon indicated that her condition of anxiety had
precluded her from assisting her attorney in answering the
4

defendants' Interrogatories in a timely manner.

The Motion for

Review did not specify why the applicant and her attorney had not
been able to respond to the Interrogatories for over four months,
nor did the Motion for Review offer any suggestion as to why the
administrative law judge's Order requiring the filing of a more
definite statement had not been complied with.

After considering

the applicant's Motion for Review, the Utah Industrial Commission
affirmed the dismissal with prejudice.
Ms. Bacon has now filed this appeal, contending that the
administrative law judge and the Industrial Commission erred in
dismissing her claim with prejudice.

However, Ms. Bacon's

appellate brief addresses, for the first time on appeal, issues
which were not raised at any stage of the Industrial Commission
proceedings below.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The above-captioned matter arises from an industrial
accident which allegedly occurred on January 17, 1991.
13.J1

(R.

Jamie Bacon, with the assistance of her counsel, filed

her Industrial Commission Application for Hearing on April 16,
1991.

(R. 13.)

The Application, signed by both Ms. Bacon and

her attorney, was (and is) incomplete.

(See, Addendum ffD.fl)

Paragraph 2 of the one-page Application form, which requires a

"R. 13" refers the Court to page 13 of the Record on Appeal.
5

description of the alleged industrial accident, was left blank by
Ms. Bacon and her attorney.

(R. 13.)

At the bottom of the

Application form, the following warning is posted in bold text:
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL BE RETURNED
SIGNATURES CERTIFY READING OF INSTRUCTIONS
ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM
Ms. Bacon's Application for Hearing was submitted to
defendants on October 15, 1991.

(R. 33.)

defendants answered the Application.

On November 14, 1991,

(R. 44-46.)

In addition,

defendants served Ms. Bacon's counsel with a Motion for More
Definite Statement due to the complete absence of a description
of the alleged industrial accident in paragraph 2 of the
Application.

(R. 41-43.)

Interrogatories were also served upon

counsel on November 14, 1991.

(R. 34-40.)

On November 22, 1991,

Administrative* Law Judge Timothy Allen issued a letter ordering
Ms. Bacon and her attorney to file a more definite statement
regarding the purported accident.

(R. 47.) (See a copy of the

letter attached as Addendum "E.")

The letter was mailed both to

Ms. Bacon and to her attorney.

(Id.)

Ms. Bacon and her attorney ignored Judge Allen's Order and
further failed to respond to defendants' Interrogatories which
should have been answered no later than December 17, 1991.

On

January 15, 1992, defendants' counsel sent a letter to
applicant's counsel advising that the Interrogatories must be
responded to within a week or a motion to dismiss would be filed.
6

(R. 48.)

After applicant ignored this request, defendants filed

a Motion to Dismiss the Application for Hearing on February 6,
1992.

(R. 82-85.)

Motion.

Applicant made no attempt to respond to this

The Motion to Dismiss was granted by Judge Allen on

February 13, 1992 dismissing the Application with prejudice for
failure to state a definite claim as required by the Order issued
November 22, 1991.

(R. 86.)

Ms. Bacon filed her Industrial Commission Motion for Review
seeking reversal of the dismissal on March 9, 1992.

(R. 87-90.)

The Motion argues that applicant's counsel had faced a good deal
of difficulty in obtaining "the necessary recital of facts from
the applicant."
Addendum "F.")

(R. 87.)

(See a copy of the Motion attached as

The Motion is supported by a letter, written by

Ms. Bacon, which states that her attempts to consider answers to
the Interrogatories had provoked a "two-day anxiety attack."
(R. 91.)

No satisfactory explanation is offered in the Motion as

to why the Interrogatories could not have been answered in the
nearly four months since they had been served.

Further, no

explanation is given as to why it was not possible for Ms. Bacon
or her attorney to respond to Judge Allen's Order to provide a
more definite statement (or even any statement at all) regarding
the purported accident.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1992, Ms. Bacon filed Answers to
Interrogatories notwithstanding the fact that this case had been
7

dismissed.

Ms. Bacon has still made no effort to comply with

Judge Allen's Order requiring a more definite statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellees contend that Ms. Bacon's appeal should be denied
in its entirety because the three issues addressed in her
appellate brief were never raised at any stage of the proceedings
below.

In her Motion for Review filed with the Industrial

Commission, Ms. Bacon simply argued that she and her attorney had
attempted to answer the defendants' Interrogatories and that any
delay in conducting and prosecuting her case was essentially due
to excusable neglect.

This Motion for Review argument is not

remotely similar to the three arguments advanced by Ms. Bacon on
appeal.

Accordingly, pursuant to well-settled Utah case law,

this Court should reject the arguments advanced by Ms. Bacon in
her brief because each of the issues in the brief has been raised
for the first time on appeal.
Even if this Court chooses to decide any of the three issues
raised by Ms. Bacon, her appeal still fails.

Each of Ms. Bacon's

three appellate issues clearly lack merit.
Ms. Bacon first contends that the administrative law judge
and the Industrial Commission committed reversible error by
dismissing her claim with prejudice.

Quite to the contrary,

utilizing its broad discretion to govern discovery proceedings
and to sanction litigants for failing to comply with orders
8

issued during those proceedings, the Industrial Commission
properly dismissed Ms. Bacon's claim.

The dismissal with

prejudice was entered only after Ms. Bacon and her attorney had
(1) signed and filed the Application for Hearing without
specifying any factual basis for the alleged industrial injury;
(2) failed to respond to the defendants' Interrogatories; (3)
failed to respond to the defendants' Motion for a More Definite
Statement; (4) failed to comply with the administrative law
judge's Order calling for the filing of an Amended Application
for Hearing setting forth a more definite statement as to the
nature of the alleged industrial accident; and (5) failed to
respond to defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

This course of

misconduct and failure to prosecute her claim provides an ample
basis for sustaining the dismissal with prejudice entered below.
Ms. Bacon next contends that the dismissal with prejudice
deprived her of her constitutionally guaranteed access to open
courts.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Ms. Bacon was

properly permitted the opportunity to file her Application
pursuant to the legislatively mandated provisions of Utah's
Workers' Compensation Act.

Due to her own inactivity and failure

to comply with the Industrial Commission's Order demanding the
filing of a more definite statement, Ms. Bacon effectively
forfeited her right to proceed with her workers' compensation
claim.

A litigant who has effectively forfeited her right to
9

pursue a remedy in Utah's open courts has absolutely no reasoned
basis to contend that the sanctions she has brought upon herself
somehow violate her constitutionally guaranteed access to open
courts.
Finally, Ms. Bacon contends that the dismissal with
prejudice entered against her should be set aside because it
derived solely from the ineffective assistance of her workers'
compensation counsel.

Again, Ms. Bacon is incorrect.

Utah does

not recognize a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel in civil and administrative proceedings.

Furthermore,

even if Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance argument can be
accorded any legal legitimacy, it is clear (as a factual matter)
that Ms. Bacon's own inaction produced the dismissal with
prejudice.

At the time she signed her Application for Hearing,

Ms. Bacon had an obligation to read the one-page form and ensure
that the very minimal information requested on the form was
complete and accurate.

Despite the ease with which the one-page

Application for Hearing can be filled out, Ms. Bacon simply chose
to leave paragraph 2 of the form blank and, accordingly, provided
neither the Industrial Commission nor the defendants with any
clue as to the nature of her industrial accident.

Further, Ms.

Bacon's alleged two-day anxiety attack with respect to
defendants' Interrogatories cannot possibly justify total
inactivity on the part of Ms. Bacon and her attorney for over
10

four months.

Indeed, the Interrogatory responses were never

submitted to the defendants until after Ms, Bacon's claim had
been dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, Ms. Bacon made no

attempt to comply with the Industrial Commission Court Order
requiring her to file an Amended Application for Hearing setting
forth a definite statement as to the nature of her industrial
accident.

This court Order was mailed directly to Ms. Bacon, but

she made no attempt to communicate with the Industrial
Commission.

The failure to prosecute her claim appears to have

arisen largely from her own anxiety and indolence.

Accordingly,

Ms. Bacon has no basis for requesting a reversal of the
Industrial Commission's dismissal with prejudice.
Throughout her brief, Ms. Bacon laments that she will be
left with no recourse should the Utah Court of Appeals uphold the
dismissal with prejudice entered below.

Ms. Bacon and her

appellate counsel know that this is not true.

Based upon her

numerous allegations regarding her former counsel's misconduct,
Ms. Bacon can certainly pursue other remedies against that
attorney.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Bacon's request

for appellate relief should be denied.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
JAMIE BACON'S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BECAUSE THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN HER BRIEF WERE NEVER
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: THE APPELLATE ISSUES ADVANCED BY
MS, BACON WERE NEVER BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND HAVE BEEN
ASSERTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
The issues addressed in appellant's brief were never raised
at any stage of the Industrial Commission proceedings below.
Accordingly, those issues cannot now be advanced and addressed
for the first time on appeal.

Pease v. Industrial Commission,

694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) (petitioner has the responsibility to
raise all issues that could be presented at the time, including
constitutional issues, for the issues to be preserved for
appeal); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984);
U.S.X. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 781 P.2d 883, (Utah App.
1989); Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602 (Utah App.
1987); Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Utah App.
1989).
The Industrial Commission Motion for Review filed by Ms.
Bacon and her attorney raised only one argument,,

In a nutshell,

Ms. Bacon contended that her claim should not be dismissed
because she and her attorney had been doing the best they could

12

to answer the defendants' Interrogatories.2
diligence"

This "due

or "excusable neglect" argument is not now one of the

issues raised by Ms. Bacon on appeal.

Indeed, not one of the

three issues raised by Ms. Bacon in her appellate brief was
included in her Industrial Commission Motion for Review.
Accordingly, none of the issues Ms. Bacon has chosen to brief has
been preserved for appeal.

As this Court observed in Johnson,

supra:
We do not consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal. Rekward v. Industrial
Commission, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah App.
1988). This general rule applies to
constitutional issues first raised on appeal
as well as to other issues. . . . [Citations
omitted.]
For the foregoing reason, Ms. Bacon's Request for appellate
relief must be denied.

2

As indicated in the Statement of Facts above, the Motion for
Review failed to adequately explain why the Interrogatories had not
been answered in over four months. The Motion for Review also
failed to address why neither Ms. Bacon nor her attorney had
attempted to respond to Judge Allen's Order calling for the filing
of a more definite statement.
13

POINT II
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN DISMISSING MS. BACON'S
CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE MS. BACON AND HER ATTORNEY WHOLLY
FAILED TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY, NEGLECTED TO RESPOND TO
DEFENSE MOTIONS, AND IGNORED THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S
DIRECT ORDER CALLING FOR THE APPLICANT TO FILE
AN AMENDED PLEADING SETTING FORTH THE
NATURE OF HER INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
It is well settled in this state and in every other
jurisdiction in the country that dismissal of a Complaint with
prejudice is an appropriate sanction when a party (like Ms. Bacon
in the present case) fails to cooperate in discovery, fails to
generally prosecute her claim, and fails to abide by a direct
Court Order which calls for the filing of an amended pleading.
Ms. Bacon and her attorney committed each of the aforesaid acts
during the pendency of the Industrial Commission proceedings
below.
As outlined in the Statement of Facts on pages 5 through 7
of this Brief, Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to file any
response to the defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement
filed concurrently with the defendants' Answer.

Further, Ms.

Bacon and her attorney failed to answer the defendants'
Interrogatories, which were also filed concurrently with
defendants' Answer, until after Ms. Bacon's worker's compensation

14

claim had been dismissed with prejudice.

To compound their

problems, Ms. Bacon and her attorney then completely failed to
respond to Administrative Law Judge Allen's November 22, 1991
letter which expressly requested that the applicant file an
amended pleading setting forth a description of her alleged
industrial accident.

It should be highlighted that Judge Allen's

letter calling for the filing of a more definite statement was
sent to both Ms. Bacon and her attorney.

Having received no

response to Judge Allen's request for an amended pleading,
defense counsel sent a letter dated January 15, 1992 requesting
that Ms. Bacon submit her overdue response to the defendants'
first set of Interrogatories.

This letter also cautioned that a

Motion to Dismiss would be filed by the defendants in the event
the Interrogatories were not responded to in a timely manner.
Subsequently, on February 6, 1992, the defendants filed
their Motion to Dismiss because the applicant and her attorney
had taken absolutely no action to move the worker's compensation
claim forward.

Neither the applicant nor her attorney filed any

response to the Motion to Dismiss.

Finally, on February 13,

1992, the administrative law judge reviewed Ms. Bacon's course of
conduct, weighed that conduct against Ms. Bacon's countervailing

3

In her Motion for Review (R. 87) , Ms. Bacon suggests that her
"two-day
anxiety
attack"
explains
why
the
defendants'
Interrogatories were not answered prior to the dismissal of her
claim.
15

right to have her claim heard on the merits, and judiciously
entered an Order dismissing Ms, Bacon's claim with prejudice.
Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding Ms.
Bacon's failure to prosecute her Industrial Commission claim, and
given her failure to respond to Judge Allen's November 22, 1991
Order (which was sent directly to the applicant herself), the
Industrial Commission acted properly in dismissing Ms. Bacon's
claim with prejudice.

While such a dismissal is often viewed by

the Courts as a measure of last resort, the inaction of Ms. Bacon
and her attorney warrant the dismissal upheld by the Industrial
Commission.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals
have upheld prejudicial dismissals of Complaints in cases similar
to the present one.

In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d

410 (Utah 1964), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the striking of a
defendant's answer and the entry of judgment against that
defendant where the defendant failed to comply with the pre-trial
discovery order entered by the court.

Similarly, in Arnica Mutual

Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), this Court
upheld a default judgment entered against a party who (even
though not in violation of a court order) had "simply refused to
cooperate in discovery."

id. at 962.

Consistent with Utah's case precedent, courts around the
country have upheld prejudicial dismissals of workers'
16

compensation claims in fact situations similar to the present
case.

In Loosev v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 744 S.W.2d 402

(Ark. App. 1988), the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that an
administrative law judge had appropriately dismissed a worker's
compensation claim with prejudice due to the worker's failure to
comply with an Industrial Commission discovery Order.

In Loosey,

the Industrial Commission administrative law judge established a
date by which discovery was to be accomplished by the parties.
When the applicant failed to respond to the defendants7
Interrogatories within the permitted time, the administrative law
judge dismissed the applicant's claim with prejudice.

The

Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld the administrative law judge's
dismissal on the grounds that Rule 37(d) of the Arkansas Rules of
Civil Procedure (which is identical to Rule 37(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure) permits dismissal as a sanction in the
event that a party disobeys a Court discovery Order.4
Similarly, appellate courts have upheld the dismissal with
prejudice of workers' compensation claims in the following cases:
Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo. App. 1991)
(dismissal was proper due to claimant's failure to abide by an
4

The Court of Appeals should keep in mind that Utah's Rules of
Civil Procedure can be, and routinely are, invoked at the
discretion of Industrial Commission administrative law judges.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1965) and Industrial Commission Rule
R490-1-4(N) which provides that "the Industrial Commission shall
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas . . . ."
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Industrial Commission discovery order); Mershon v. Oreaonian
Pub., 772 P.2d 440 (Or. App. 1989); Liggett v. State Indus. Ins.
System, 661 P.2d 882 (Nev. 1983); Iafornaro v. Charter Builders,
557 So.2d 898 (Fl. App. 1990); Martin v. The South Coast Corp.,
356 So.2d 500 (La. App. 1977); Smith v. Ballou, Johnson & Nichols
Co., 437 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 1981); Regal Wood Products, Inc. v.
Mendez, 432 So.2d 141 (Fl. App. 1983) (where the applicant made
no showing of good cause for failure to prosecute, his workers'
compensation claim had to be dismissed); Roberts v. Indus.
Commission, 451 N.E. 2d 857 (111. 1983) (dismissal for lack of
prosecution of claim was within the sound discretion of the
Industrial Commission); Overstreet v. Home Indemnity Co., 747
S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App. 1987) (lower court did not abuse its
discretion when it dismissed claimant's action v/ith prejudice due
to claimant's failure to comply with a court discovery order);
Notman v. Indus. Commission, 579 N.E.2d 370 (111. App. 1991)
(Industrial Commission has inherent authority to dismiss a claim
due to claimant's failure to comply with an order requiring
disclosure of income tax returns).
The facts of the present case and the facts of the Loosey
case (cited on page 17 above) are indistinguishable, with the
exception that Ms. Bacon's failure to cooperate in the discovery
process and failure to abide by an express Industrial Commission
Order are more egregious than the delay committed by the
18

applicant in Loosey.

On the basis of the well-settled law in

this and other jurisdictions, the dismissal of Ms. Bacon's claim
should be affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals.
The dismissal with prejudice upheld by the Industrial
Commission is sanctioned not only by the case law cited above,
but also by the rules of procedure governing practice before the
Commission.

(See, f.n. 4, supra.)

Under the Utah Industrial

Commission Rules in effect at the time Ms. Bacon filed her
Application in this case, the

Commission and its administrative

law judges governed discovery proceedings according to the
following general provision:
R490-1-4.

Pleadings and Discovery.

H. Upon filing the Answer, the defendant may
commence discovery with appropriate sets of
interrogatories. . . . Failure of an
applicant to comply with [defendants'
discovery] request may result in the
dismissal of a claim . . . .
This provision, particularly when read in light of Rule
37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly sanctions
the dismissal with prejudice entered by the administrate law
judge and upheld by the Industrial Commission.

The

administrative law judge and the Industrial Commission acted
appropriately and within the bounds of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in dismissing Ms. Bacon's claim with prejudice due to
her failure to participate in discovery and especially due to her
failure to abide by or even respond to the express Order of the
19

Industrial Commission calling for the filing of an amended
pleading setting forth a definite statement as to the nature of
her alleged industrial claim.

The propriety of the dismissal

with prejudice is particularly evident, and should be affirmed by
this Court, because Rule 37(d) vests trial courts with broad
discretionary power to dismiss claims when a party disobeys a
court order or refuses to cooperate in the discovery process.
See, W.W. & W..B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc. , 568
P.2d 734 (Utah 1977); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift
& Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1976); Sheid v. Hewlett Packard,
826 P.2d 396 (Colo. App. 1991); and Loosey v. Osmose Wood
Preserving Co., 744 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. App. 1988).
Ms. Bacon argues that the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in
Doubletree, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah
App. 1990) somehow demonstrates that the Industrial Commission
committed error in upholding the administrative law judge's
dismissal with prejudice.

The applicant's reliance upon

Doubletree is completely misplaced.
contains a very narrow holding.

The Doubletree opinion

Writing for the majority,

Justice Orme simply specified in Doubletree that Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46(b)-3(3)(d) (1989) of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act permits the Industrial Commission to dismiss a worker's
compensation claim without prejudice.

However, the Doubletree

opinion does not suggest that the Industrial Commission is
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without power to also dismiss workers' compensation claims with
prejudice.

Indeed, the Doubletree holding cannot be extended

this far in light of Rule 37(d) and the foregoing case law
analysis contained in appellees' brief.

Accordingly, the

Doubletree opinion has no precedential effect in the context of
Ms. Bacon's appeal.
Ms. Bacon also contends that Bonneville Tower Condominium
Management Committee v. Thompson Miche Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017
(Utah 1986) somehow demonstrates that the Industrial Commission
erred in dismissing her worker's compensation claim with
prejudice.

Again, Ms. Bacon is mistaken.

Bonneville Tower

analyzes the propriety of dismissing a claim for failure to join
an indispensable party.

The dismissal reviewed in Bonneville

Tower has nothing to do with a party's failure to prosecute her
claim, failure to cooperate in discovery or failure to abide by a
court Order.

Accordingly, the facts and holding of Bonneville

Tower are entirely inapposite in the context of the present
appeal.
Ms. Bacon also argues in Point I of her appellate brief that
the administrative law judge and Industrial Commission below
somehow erred in determining that Ms. Bacon's Application for
Hearing could not sustain an award on her behalf "under any set
of facts which could be proved in support of [her] claim."
p. 11 of Ms. Bacon's Utah Court of Appeals Brief.)
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(See

Ms. Bacon's

assignment of error in this regard lacks merit for two reasons.
First, by examining Ms. Bacon's Application for Hearing (attached
hereto as Addendum "D"), the Court will observe that paragraph 2
of the Application flatly fails to advance any state of facts in
support of the requested worker's compensation award.
Accordingly, the administrative law judge and the Industrial
Commission could not examine the potential merits of Ms. Bacon's
claim and thereby enter an order more favorable to her when
absolutely no facts were ever advanced by Ms. Bcicon in support of
her hypothetical worker's compensation claim.

For this reason,

the notice pleading cases (Arrow Indus., Inc. v., Zion's First
Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); Freegard v. First Western
Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987); and Christensen v. Lelis
Automatic Transmission Service, Inc., 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970))
cited by Ms. Bacon on p. 11 of her brief have absolutely no
bearing on the facts of the present case.
Second, Ms. Bacon has mischaracterized the basis upon which
the dismissal with prejudice is premised.

The administrative law

judge and the Industrial Commission did not enter the dismissal
solely on the basis of Ms. Bacon's failure to state a definite
claim.

Quite to the contrary, it was the following combination

of inaction and misconduct which led to the prejudicial
dismissal:

(1) Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to specify any

factual basis for the alleged worker's compensation claim in the
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body of the Application for Hearing; (2) Ms. Bacon and her
attorney failed to respond to the defendants' Motion for More
Definite Statement which was filed concurrently with the
defendants' Answer on November 14, 1991; (3) Ms. Bacon and her
attorney completely failed to respond to the defendants'
Interrogatories which were also filed on November 14, 1991;
(4) Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to respond to the
administrative law judge's direct Order (entered November 22,
1991) calling for the filing of an amended Application for
Hearing setting forth the factual basis for Ms. Bacon's worker's
compensation claim; (5) Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to
respond to or act in accordance with defense counsel's letter
dated January 15, 1992 requesting the applicant's overdue
response to the defendants' Interrogatories; and (6) Ms. Bacon
and her attorney wholly failed to respond to the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss filed on February 6, 1992. When the foregoing
course of inactivity and misconduct is viewed in its totality,
the Utah Court of Appeals should conclude that there was ample
justification for the Industrial Commission's prejudicial
dismissal of Ms. Bacon's worker's compensation claim.
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POINT III
WHETHER UTAH'S "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION GUARANTEES
THAT A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE CAN NEVER
BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
Ms. Bacon contends that the Open Courts provision of the
Utah Constitution has somehow been violated by virtue of the
Industrial Commission's dismissal of her worker's compensation
claim.

This contention is entirely erroneous when applied to the

facts of this case.

Ms. Bacon was afforded the full benefit of

the Open Courts constitutional provision when she was permitted
to file and prosecute her industrial claim pursuant to Utah's
Workers' Compensation Act.

The fact that her own inactivity and

misconduct has now led to the prejudicial dismissal of her claim
has absolutely nothing to do with a Open Courts analysis.5

To

use Ms. Bacon's logic, any time an Industrial Commission or civil
litigant is sanctioned and dismissed for failing to prosecute a
claim or abide by a court order, that litigant has inherently
suffered a violation of his or her constitutional right to the
access of Utah's open courts.

This position is nonsensical.

A

litigant's constitutional guarantee of access to open courts can
only go so far.

If the applicant abuses or mistreats his or her

constitutional right, then he or she may suffer the forfeiture of
5

An Open Courts constitutional analysis arises when a statute
(typically a statute of repose) operates to preclude or bar a
litigant from filing her claim. See, Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). No such statute is at
issue in this case.
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that right by virtue of a court order dismissing his or her
claim.

It is a tortuous argument, at best, for that litigant to

then turn around and contend that his or her forfeiture of the
right to prosecute his or her claim is somehow tantamount to a
constitutional deprivation of his or her open courts right.
Ms. Bacon is also mistaken in arguing that she will be left
with no recourse should the Utah Court of Appeals uphold the
dismissal with prejudice entered by the Industrial Commission.
Indeed, according to her unilateral version of her course of
dealing with her former attorney, she may well have a remedy
against that attorney.

In short, Ms. Bacon has been afforded the

full benefit of her constitutional guarantee to the access of an
open court, and that access is still wide open should she choose
to proceed against her former attorney whom she claims so
severely prejudiced her rights.
POINT IV
THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS DO NOT GUARANTEE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NON-CRIMINAL CASES
Ms. Bacons contention that her claim should be remanded
because she was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
administrative proceedings below is incorrect for two reasons.
First, under Utah law, Ms. Bacon has no basis for asserting
an ineffective assistance of counsel argument in the context of
this Industrial Commission case.
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The Utah Court of Appeals has

expressly held that "ineffective assistance of counsel is a sixth
Amendment right limited to criminal law."

Richins v. Delbert,

Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 386, f.n. 2 (Utah App.
1991).

Pursuant to this legal standard, Ms. Bacon's claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

Indeed, the

Pennsylvania cases relied upon by Ms. Bacon on page 17 of her
appellate Brief readily concur with the holding announced by this
Court in Richins.

In Bickel v. W. C. A. B., 538 A.2d 661 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1988) the Pennsylvania Court of Appeals explicitly stated
that "the substantive due process right to effective assistance
of counsel is not applicable to civil or administrative
proceedings."

(Emphasis added.)

Id. at 663.6

Pursuant to both

the Richins and Bickel standards, Ms. Bacon has no legal basis
for asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel argument.
Second, even if Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance of
counsel argument is legally proper, the argument fails due to Ms.
Bacon's role in producing the dismissal with prejudice entered

6

The court in Bickel did decide that an examination of the
effectiveness of a worker's attorney is relevant in the very narrow
context of determining whether the Industrial Commission abused its
discretion in refusing to allow the worker a rehearing of his
claim. This narrow issue is not before the Utah Court of Appeals
in the present case, because Ms. Bacon and her present appellate
counsel never attempted to obtain a rehearing at any time during
the Industrial Commission proceedings below.
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below.7

At least three significant events, which occurred

during Ms. Bacon's attempt to prosecute her worker's compensation
claim, reveal that Ms. Bacon is as responsible as her former
counsel for the dismissal with prejudice entered by the
Industrial Commission.
As this Court is aware, Ms. Bacon signed her Application for
Hearing which is dated April 16, 1991.

At the bottom of the

Application for Hearing, printed in bold text, the Application
indicates "UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL BE RETURNED."

In

signing the Application, Ms. Bacon must be charged with the
responsibility of ensuring (along with her attorney) the accuracy
of the information contained in the Application.

By leaving

paragraph 2 of the Application completely blank, Ms. Bacon and
her attorney were simply asking that the Industrial Commission
reject the Application for Hearing.

Any applicant genuinely

7

In the event the Utah Court of Appeals determines that it
needs to review Ms. Bacon's course of conduct during the
proceedings below, the Court should be aware of the following
language from the California opinion cited on page 17 of
appellant's Brief. In Orange Empire Nat'l Bank v. Kirk, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 240, 244 (Cal. App. 1968) the court observed that:
. . . the law ordinarily charges the client
with the inexcusable neglect of his attorney,
and gives him redress against his counsel
[citations omitted], . . . [but only] the
client who is relatively free from personal
neglect will be relieved from a default or
dismissal attributable to the inaction or
procrastination of his counsel.
[Citations
omitted.]
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concerned with the adequate prosecution her claim will at least
go to the trouble of describing the accident which forms the
basis of that claim.

To suggest that an applicant who signs an

Application for Hearing is not responsible for misrepresentations
and omissions contained on the simple one-page form, is to
suggest that the Industrial Commissions streamlined, userfriendly process for initiating a worker's compensation claim is
somehow overly burdensome.
Even if Ms. Bacon was not apprised of the defendants' Motion
for More Definite Statement (which was served on November 14,
1991), Ms. Bacon at a minimum knew about Judge Allen's letter
dated November 22, 1991 (attached hereto at Addendum "E").

Ms.

Bacon took no action to either retain new counsel or ensure that
the missing information in paragraph 2 of her Application for
Hearing was filled in and provided to the Industrial Commission
and the defendants.

Ms. Bacon's own inactivity and carelessness

in failing to respond to a direct Court Order has created the
prejudice of which she now complains.
It is also interesting to note that Ms. Bacon's Motion for
Review (attached as Addendum "F") specifies that she was aware of
the need to provide Interrogatory answers to the defendants but
that she had difficulty in doing so as a result of her anxiety.
While it is true that Ms. Bacon's attorney could have taken a
number of steps in an attempt to keep her claim alive, it appears
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that Ms. Bacon's failure to assist her attorney in responding to
the defendants' Interrogatories caused the principal delay which
ultimately led to the dismissal with prejudice.

Ms. Bacon argues

on page 16 of her brief that her attorney "failed for two months
to furnish [her] with defense Interrogatories so that additional
information could be obtained."

This assertion, however, is not

supported by the record on appeal.

Ms. Bacon's own Motion for

Review, filed on March 9, 1992, reveals that her former attorney
had experienced persistent problems in obtaining cooperation and
information from Ms. Bacon so that the Interrogatories could be
answered.
As with her open courts constitutional argument, Ms. Bacon
is pointing a finger in the wrong direction when she contends
that her worker's compensation claim should be remanded and
adjudicated due to her allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Quite to the contrary, if Ms. Bacon feels so strongly

that her former counsel has caused the prejudice she has
suffered, then her proper avenue of recourse is against that
attorney.

Indeed, this is the only course of action which should

be sanctioned by the Utah Court of Appeals because the Court
cannot engage in speculation in an attempt to ascertain the
veracity of Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations.

The Court can discern from the record, however,

that Ms. Bacon failed to properly execute her Application for
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Hearing at the time she signed it, failed to in any way respond
to Judge Allen's November 22, 1991 Order, and apparently impeded
her attorney's efforts to answer the defendants' Interrogatories.
With these observations in hand, the Utah Court of Appeals
can reject Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance of counsel argument
on any of three separate grounds.
basis in Utah law.

First, the argument has no

Second, the issue was not preserved for

appeal (Point I above).

Or, third, the state of the factual

record currently before the Court reveals that Ms. Bacon is at
least as responsible as her own attorney for the dismissal with
prejudice entered by the Industrial Commission.
For each of the aforesaid reasons, appellees respectfully
request that the dismissal entered by the Industrial Commission
be upheld on appeal.
DATED this

1 ^

day of

C^^Q^t^-

/ 1992.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

MICHAELS. DYER
MICHAEL A. PETERSO^
Attorneys for Appellees
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ADDENDUM A

Rule 37

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).

their authenticity, to accept a copy of defendant's written admissions served upon plaintiff
as compliance with the rules; where the trial
court chose the latter option, it was proper to
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admissions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v.
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982).

—Motion to dismiss.
Tolling.
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for admissions which are not answered within 45
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).

—Failure to respond.
Objectionable matter.
Even if a request for an admission is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to
respond to the request, then that party should
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v.
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah
1985).
Prison inmate.
When inmate served requests for admissions
and interrogatories on prison officials in action
for recovery of value of personal property taken
from him, on failure of officials to respond to
the requests, apply for extension of time, or
move to amend or withdraw their admissions
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were

—Punitive damages.
Where plaintiff requests an admission of punitive damages in an amount unrelated to actual damages, the court, as a matter of equity,
must intervene and examine the admission.
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98
(Utah 1985).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151,
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734
(Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325.
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110.
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in civil case, admissions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and
rules, to respond to request for admission of

facts not within his personal knowledge, 20
A.L.R.3d 756.
Formal sufficiency of response to request for
admissions under state discovery rules, 8
A.L.R.4th 728.
Permissible scope, respecting nature of inquiry, of demand for admissions under modern
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489.
Key Numbers. — Discovery <s=> 121 to 129.

Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c),
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
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Rule 37

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compilers Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-32-1 et seq.
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ADDENDUM B

35-1-88

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ing Workmen's Compensation Act. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363
(1937).
Attorneys' fees in compensation cases should
be measured according to the workingman's
station. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah
432, 64 P.2d 363 (1937).

fees in same manner and with same limitations as it may review any other decision of the
commission. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91
Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363 (1937); Thatcher v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d
(1949).
„
Suspension of attorney from practice.
Attorney's indirect collection of fees from clients in excess of those awarded by Industrial
Commission constituted unprofessional conduct resulting in one year's suspension from
practice. In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 P.2d
961 (1945).

Review by Supreme Court.
Industrial Commission not only has power to
fix attorneys' fees in cases before it, but it also
has power to fix fees for services rendered on
review in Supreme Court, Supreme Court only
having power to review matter of attorney's

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
C.J.S. — 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 817.
A.L.R. — Handling, preparing, presenting,

or trying workmen's compensation claims or
cases as practice of law, 2 A.L.R.2d 724.
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
<§=> 1981.

35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission and hearing examiner — Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the
usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in
dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited
to the following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts
or other records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 88; C.L. 1917,
§ 3148; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-82; L. 1965,
ch. 67, § 1.

Meaning of "this act". — See same catchline in notes following § 35-1-46.
Cross-References. — Rules for procedure of
commission, § 35-1-10.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

84

granted 0therwise, compensal • * • . .: >•.* ;,. • \ •-,*t, *::.
.%
Mii>iu;i in for Hearing with the Commission
lowed.
L/. Wnen an Application for Hearing is filed with
P. "Attending Physician's Statement — Form U4J
— This form must be completed by employee and his the Commission, the Commission shall forthwith
last attending physician in the state to establish the mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's inmedical condition of the employee. It must be accom- surance carrier.
panied by Form 044.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30
Q. "Compensation Agreement — Form 019" — days following the date of the mailing of the applicaThis form is used by the parties to a workers' compen- tion to file a written answer with the Industrial Comsation claim to enter into an agreement as to a per- mission, admitting or denying liability for the claim.
manent partial impairment award, and must be sub- The answer should state all affirmative defenses with
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may
mitted to the Commission for approval.
R. "Application for Lump Sum or Advance Pay- be fully informed of the * nature of the defense asment — Form 134" — This form is used by an em- serted. All answers shall include a summary and catployee to apply for a lump sum or advance payment egorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A
copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one,
for a permanent partial impairment award.
S. "Release to Return to Work — Form 110" — to the applicant's attorney by the defendant.
This form may be used to meet the requirements of
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to
Rule R490-2-3E, as contained herein.
file an answer within the 30 days provided above, the
T. "Insurance Carrier or Self-Insured Employer Commission may enter a default against such emAnnual Statement of Losses — Form 117" — Parts (a) ployer or insurance carrier. The Commission may
and (b) are to be submitted together by January 31st then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bearfor the preceding calendar year. Part (a), an individ- ing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the
ual loss claim log, states the losses by individual evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by
claim and part (b) states the aggregate losses by the following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of
insurance carrier or self-insured employer for the pre- Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant employer or insurance carrier and shall not be
ceding calendar year.
Carriers or self-insured employers wishing to sub- construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance
mit a computer tape in lieu of the form must obtain Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any apprior written authorization from the Industrial Com- propriate defenses.
F. Where the answer denies liability solely on the
mission, Industrial Accidents Division.
U. "Disability Status Report — Form 206" — This medical aspects of the case, the applicant, through
report is required, as per Section 35-10-6, U.C.A., his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insurwhen an injured worker's temporary total compensa- ance carrier, with the approval of the Commission or
tion exceeds 90 days, or when it appears that the its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of
injured worker will be disabled, whichever comes facts, which stipulation, together with the medical
first. The insurance carrier or the self-insured em- documents bearing on the case in the Commission's
ployer shall file this report with the Commission file, may be used in making the final determination
of liability.
within 30 days thereafter.
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or
V. "Request for Copies From Claimant's File —
Form 205" — This form is used to request copies from its representatives may have a pre-hearing or post
a claimant's file in the Industrial Commission with hearing conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may
the appropriate authorized release.
W. "Medical Records — Copies — Form 302" — commence discovery with appropriate sets of interThis form is used by a claimant to request a free copy rogatories. Such discovery should focus on the acciof his/her medical records from a medical provider. dent event, witnesses, as well as past and present
This form must be signed by a staff member of the medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to
appropriately signed medical releases to allow gathIndustrial Accidents Division.
X. The Director of the Industrial Accidents Divi- ering of pertinent medical records. The defendant
sion of the Commission may approve change of any of may also require the applicant to submit to an indethe above forms upon notice to all concerned parties. pendent medical examination to be conducted by a
Carriers may print these forms or approved versions. physician of the defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in
R490-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery.
the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.C.A., all of a hearing.
adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all
and occupational disease claims shall only be com- discovery proceedings and must be signed, unless
menced by the injured worker or dependent filing a good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one
request for agency action with the Commission. The week prior to any scheduled hearing.
Administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion in
J. All medical records shall be filed by the emallowing intervention of other parties pursuant to ployer or its insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit
Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. The Application for Hearing at least one week before the scheduled hearing.
is the request for agency action. All such applications Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent
shall include supporting medical documentation of medical records contained in his file to the employer
the claim where there is a dispute over medical is- or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submissues. Applications without supporting documentation sion two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing.
will not be mailed to the employer or insurance car- Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed binder
rier for answer until the appropriate documents have arranged by care provider in chronological order. Exbeen provided.
hibits should include all relevant treatment records
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is with the exception of hospital nurses notes.
denied by an employer or insurance carrier, the burK. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified
den rests on the applicant to initiate the action by one week in advance of any proceeding where it is

anticipated that more than four witnesses will be
called, or where it is anticipated t h a t the hearing of
the evidence will require more than two hours.
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding will be issued in accordance with
the provisions of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10,
U.C.A.
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review of an Order by the Agency may file a written request for review in accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-46b-12,13,14,15, and 16, U.C.A.
A Motion for Review of any order entered by an Administrative Law J u d g e may be filed pursuant to the
provisions of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. Unless so
filed, the Order will become the award of the Commission and will be final. If appropriately filed, the
Administrative Law J u d g e may:
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and receiving
such further evidence as may be deemed necessary,
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental order, or
3. Refer the entire case to the Commission for review under Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A.
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided above, it shall be final unless a Motion for Review of the same is filed with the
Commission.
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Industrial Commission shall generally follow the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the
issuance of subpoenas, except as the U t a h Rules of
Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of Section 35-1-88, U.C.A., or as may be otherwise modified by the presiding officer.
0 . A request for reconsideration of a Commission's
Order on Motion for Review may be allowed and shall
be governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-13,
U.C.A. Any petition for judicial review of the Commission's Order on Motion for Review shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, U.C.A.
R490-1-5. A l l o w a n c e for Mailing.
A. Whenever a notice or other paper requiring or
permitting some action on behalf of a party is served
on a party by mail, three days shall be added to the
prescribed period as allowed under Rule 6 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. This three day extension
does not apply to notices sent by registered mail as
required by Sections 35-1-46(3) and 35-1-46.30(2),
U.C.A.
R490-1-6. B u s i n e s s Hours.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-9, U.C.A., the office of the
Commission shall be open for receipt of official documents during business hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Any official document received after 5:00 p.m. shall
be considered received on the next working day.
R490-1-7. Attorney F e e s .
Pursuant to Section 35-1-87, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following procedure to regulate and
fix the fees for attorneys representing applicants before the Commission:
A. The concept of a contingency fee is recognized.
However, a retainer in advance of a Commission approved fee will not be allowed.
B. In allowing the following amounts, the schedule
presupposes a hearing based upon issues which results in a written Order by the Administrative Law
Judge. Some discretion may be used by the Administrative Law Judge to vary from the following if the

result would be unconscionable to either the worker
or his/her attorney.
1. 20% of weekly compensation generated for the
first $15,000.
2. 15% of the weekly compensation generated in
excess of $15,000 but not exceeding $30,000.
3. 10% of the weekly compensation generated in
excess of $30,000.
4. In no case shall an attorney collect fees calculated on more t h a n the first six years of any and all
combinations of workers' compensation awards.
5. Attorney fees shall be allowed only when compensation is generated by the attorney. There shall
be no attorney fees awarded for medical claims.
6. When an attorney takes an employee's case to
the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court, and prevails, a fee will be determined in addition to the
above schedule.
7. In all cases where settlement or admission of
liability is obtained prior to a hearing, or where assistance is provided in preparing and filling out forms or
making contacts with defendants or other services —
short of a hearing — the usual and customary hourly
charges for the attorney may be approved. However,
all such charges must be approved by the Commission or one of its Administrative Law Judges prior to
payment. Reasonable proof and documentation of additional gain of compensation by an attorney shall be
provided to an Administrative Law Judge when requested.
R490-1-8. Witness Fees.
Each witness who shall appear before the Commission by its order shall receive from the Commission
for his/her attendance fees and mileage as provided
for witnesses by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Otherwise, each party is required to subpoena witnesses at their own expense,
R490-1-9. G u i d e l i n e s for Utilization of Medical
Panel.
P u r s u a n t to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more t h a n $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize
an injured worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing
these medical issues in all cases where:
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APPLICATION FOR HEARING

*
Employees S t r e e t Address

» »
*

City/State/Zip
U/

./ tX S * t/

> /? St.(v-ti-t

f C-JC

-*

Employers' Insurance Carrier

*

APPLICANT ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35:
1. * I sustained an injury by accident arising out of ir in the course of employment wi
Defendant (employer) on the
day of )
19 '7/
Location (Give name & complete address or nearest junction, mile marker, etc.)
2.

The accident, ocurred as fol 1 ows:

(Describe accident and result ing injuries ) _

The injury • :aused temporary total disability from 1-P7 - 91
to £, •*•>'* w ~
Date fi rst off
Date Return
Compensation has been paid for the following period(s)i
period(s) of time paid, and the last payment date) />*/LC

(Indicate weekly amoun

This Claim is filed because
(Please mark an X in the appropriate space(s))
A. v Defendants have refused payment of medical expenses.
B. X Compensation has not been paid for any/all periods of time off work.
Defendants have denied liability for permanent partial disability.
C,
D.
I am claiming
Additional temporary total disability;
additi.on.il
medical benefits;
additional permanent partial disability
E _ _ I am claiming permanent total disability.
F, _____ Other Reason (specify)
_ _ _ _ _
IN ADDITION, THE CLAIMANT ALLEGES; (Please fill in or mark appropriate blank)
6, My date of birth is T~ ? - ^»
. My wage at the time of injury was $ft*/7
_/day_
/ week
/ month
hours per week C
::ar
nou:
working Q0
(specify method of payment)_
married and had
I was
/was not
children under age 18 dependent on me for support.
Dat .e U-

/

^ c?'

V

V - / » 1 ' <-

Printed name of-^Applicant
^

'

•" ,

l

7.

uy\g ( Maccy^

/ ; , / ,

Printed Name of Attorney

Signature of Applicant
/ 2 ^ >

Signature of Attorney

^ • :l h

J •

Street Address of Applicant:

Street address & Office -

Attorney

City/State/Zip of Applicant
yiv-j-f>

City/State/Zip ~~~

Telephone

/

Applicant's Telephone

<*?2-cy~/7/?

Social Security #

UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILI BE RETURNED
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HEARING PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS
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»

*
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,

•
•
•- • •

•-•

• • » » •

• •

• •
•-

• • • •

(1) Fcnt'p.l *\, not ices ^of your hearing d^t^ will J)e mail£t| upon the Commission
receiving a formal written denial of your claim b^ the DeYerfdants.
(2)
Cases must? *be* completely prepared before*; the hearing.
You should
therefore begin 3iiamediately to prepare your caSe0; All necessary witnesses,
documents and medidal reports must be read^**at* - the hearing.
Physicians
normally supply copies of all medical reports to the Commission. However, the
parties should verify that all medical reports have been submitted to our
office prior to the hearing.
(3) Hearing notices will be mailed sufficiently in advance of your hearing to
allow your adjusting appointments, getting time off work or clearing your
calendar of any conflicts with the hearing date,
(A) The employee must know the exact
because of his injury.

dates

that he has lost from work

(5) Witnesses are needed only to prove issues which are in dispute. If
requested, subpoenas will be issued, but service of subpoenas must be arranged
for and witness fees paid by the party making the request.
(6) It is optional with the employee whether he desires to be represented by
an attorney, or not. In many cases an employee is at a disadvantage without
advice and representation of expert counsel.
The fees of attorneys
representing an employee, or his/her dependent, will be fixed by the
Commission. The fees are limited to 20% of the compensation award, exclusive
of medical expenses.
(7) If you are not represented by an attorney and are in doubt as to what to
do, communicate with the office of the Industrial Commission of Utah. When
writing, always refer to the case by date of injury and the name of the
insured employee and his/her employer. Please notify this Commission of any
changes in your address following your initial application.
(8) If the claim is for additional compensation and/or medical benefits, the
matter will not be set for hearing until a current medical report from the
treating physician has be^n filed with the Commission indicating:
a.

The present disability is greater than the prior rating given
and is due to the accident stated in paragraph (1) on the other
side, and/or

b.

Additional medical treatment and/or hospitalization is required
because of the accident stated in paragraph (1) on the other
side.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
Sloven M. Hadloy
N o r m a n H. B a n g u r t e r
Ciovernor

Timothy C. Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge

160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City. Utah 84151 -0250

(801) 530-6800

Chairman

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

November 2 2 ,

1991

Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

(801) 530-6804 (Fax)

Randy M Lish
Attorney at Law
93 0 South State #10
Orem UT 84058
Re:
Inj:
Emp:

Jamie Bacon
01-17-91
IPP Service Center

Dear Mr Lish:
Our office is in receipt of an answer to the Application for
Hearing filed in the above matter. In reviewing the file, I note
that it will be necessary for you to provide a more definite
statement regarding what happened on January 17, 1991. Please be
advised that no hearing will be scheduLed in this matter until our
office receives this information.
Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any assistance
in this matter.
BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

ren
re Law Judge
TCA/mm
cc:

Jamie Bacon, 1235 West Main, Delta UT 84624
Michael Dyer, Atty, P O Box 2465, SLC UT 84110-2465

ADDENDUM F

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

RANDY M. LISH (3823)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
Attorneys for Applicant
930 South State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 224-2119

8

—BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH—

9

Case No. 4/s>(9/6 i?

10
OOOOOOO

11
12

JAIME BACON,
MOTION FOR REVIEW
Applicant,

13

vs.
14 INTERMOUNTAIN POWER SERVICE
CORPORATION and WAUSAU
15 | INSURANCE COMPANIES,
16

Defendants.
oooOooo

17
18
19

COMES NOW the applicant, Jaime Bacon, and submits her Motion
for Review of the Commission's Order of Dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

20
21

1.

On November

22, 1991, Defendants

requested

a more

22

definite statement of the nature of the injury to the applicant and

23

how it occurred.

24

November 14, 1991.

25

2.

Interrogatories were also served on applicant on

In attempting to verify the necessary recital of facts

26

from the applicant, applicant's attorney found that reviewing the

27

details of the series of incidents leading up to applicant's injury

28

caused applicant serious distress (see exhibit "A").

jllough, Jones,
& Ivins
South State St
Suite 10

Applicant

1
2
3
4
finally did inform her attorney that she had filed a complete
5
statement with the claims adjuster for Wausau, Mr. Jim Lloyd.
6
Applicant's attorney contacted Mr. Lloyd by phone on January 9*

F

7
1992, as soon as he learned of the report, to request it be
8
released.

Mr. Lloyd assured applicant's attorney that he would

9
contact his company's attorney as soon as he returned to the office
10

the following Monday.

11
3.

Applicant's attorney contacted Defendant's attorney's

12
office and left a message requesting said attorney contact him upon
13
returning to his office.

To date, applicant's attorney has not

14
been able to obtain a copy of the statement of facts given to the
15
adjuster.
16
ARGUMENT
17
Applicant's claim is for job-induced stress.

In reciting

18
numerous

times

the

specific

incidents

giving

rise

to

the

19
applicant's inability to continue working, applicant has undergone
20
serious stress attacks (see exhibit "A"). Applicant's attorney has
21
attempted

to

obtain

information

already

provided

to

one of

22
Defendants' employees

in order to alleviate added

stress to

23
applicant, but has been unsuccessful. It is applicant's contention
24
that the matter should not be dismissed considering that defendants
25
have a full statement of the details of the incidents leading up to
26
applicant's

disability

in

their

possession,

and

Applicant's

27
response is included with this response to the motion.
28
iliough, Jones,
& Ivins
South State St.
Suite 10

"*"255^r*'

4

•
9

3

1
2
3
4
Applicant

has

not

intentionally

ignored

the

Industrial

5
Commission's requests, nor those of the Defendants, but has
6
suffered severe stress in trying to verify for her attorney the
7
8
9
10
11

specific details needed for the responses requested. Based on the
circumstances of applicant, and the attempts to provide Defendants
with

the requested

information, Applicant

requests that the

Commission reconsider its decision to dismiss Applicant's claim.
DATED this 9_

day of March, 1992.

12
13

MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS

14
15
16 II

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

fo&^Jsfr / ^

Randy ^M. L i s h
Attorney for Applicant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion for Review by first-class mail, postage prepaid,
this '/r* day of March, 1992, to Michael E. Dyer, Attorney for
Defendants, Key Bank Tower, Suite 700, 50 South Main Street, P.O.
Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465.
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